The banker, the buyer and the bag maker.

This case ends in a Louis Vuitton boutique. But it begins with an underworld banker already known to European law enforcement.

On 31 May 2023, Thanas Bako, a 53-year-old Greek national was arrested in Athens following cooperation between Greek police, Europol, and US investigators who infiltrated the encrypted ANOM communications network. Authorities allege he coordinated the movement and cleaning of approximately €500 million linked to international drug traffickers.

In September 2024, the Rotterdam court sentenced Bako to seven years’ imprisonment for organised crime and managing a large money transfer network. He remains detained in the Netherlands following extradition.

According to the Public Prosecution Service:

• Between June 2020 and March 2021, the network collected over €246 million and paid out nearly €248 million
• Couriers with clean criminal records transported cash using company vans
• “Tokens” such as banknotes with specific serial numbers verified delivery
• Two warehouse “offices” in Wateringen and Nieuw-Vennep were used to count and store money
• One warehouse handled over €165 million
• Intercepted messages show Bako discussing how much money had been “gathered” and how much had been “kicked” — collected and delivered.

The Lelystad buyer: €2 Million in designer goods

According to Dutch prosecutors, part of Bako's criminal cash flowed to a 36-year-old woman from Lelystad, publicly identified as Bei W.

Between August 2021 and February 2023, she is suspected of spending more than €2 million in criminal proceeds at luxury retailers including Louis Vuitton.

Her purchasing strategy was deliberate:

• Payments under multiple aliases
• Use of different email addresses
• Transactions spread across all four official Louis Vuitton locations in the Netherlands
• Repeated cash purchases typically priced between €2,500 and €3,000 per bag

Each purchase, taken alone, appeared routine. The pattern did not.

Daigou as a laundering mechanism

Prosecutors say Bei W. shipped the bags to China in cardboard moving boxes, reselling them there so that proceeds appeared to stem from legitimate commercial activity.

Authorities describe this as Daigou trade - a legitimate cross-border personal shopping model that can also function as a value-transfer channel.

The alleged laundering cycle:

• Criminal cash collected by underground bankers
• Luxury goods purchased in the Netherlands
• Goods exported to China
• Resale proceeds presented as legitimate trade income

Evidence cited by prosecutors includes:

• Encrypted chat messages
• Receipts
• Security camera footage
• Boxes found in her home, packed for shipment

Luxury goods provide an attractive integration vehicle: portable, high-value, globally liquid and difficult to trace once resold.

Assistance from a former employee

The Public Prosecution Service identified two additional suspects. One woman allegedly assisted Bei W. by tracking purchases and maintaining records. A third suspect, a former Louis Vuitton sales associate, allegedly:

• Alerted her when high-value bags arrived in stock
• Warned her if spending through one account risked exceeding reporting thresholds

Until 1 January 2026, Dutch law required companies to report unusual cash transactions of €10,000 or more under the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Prevention) Act (Wwft). This included linked cash payments within a short period exceeding €10,000.

Prosecutors say spending was structured to remain below these triggers.

From 1 January 2026, professional sellers in the Netherlands will be prohibited from accepting cash payments of €3,000 or more, significantly reducing room for threshold structuring.

Know Your Customer and the Wwft breach

The Public Prosecution Service concluded that Louis Vuitton violated the Wwft by failing to adequately verify the identity of customers who repeatedly spent large sums of cash over an extended period.

The same buyer used multiple names within a short timeframe. The behaviour was not sufficiently questioned.

The “Know Your Customer” principle is a statutory obligation under Dutch law. Retailers in high-value sectors are expected to detect patterns of suspicious behaviour, not simply process transactions.

Prosecutors determined that Louis Vuitton did not do enough to prevent its stores being used to launder criminal proceeds.

Settlement and ongoing proceedings

The criminal case against Bei W, the assisting woman and the former sales associate
remains ongoing. A further hearing date has not yet been set.

The Public Prosecution Service settled the case against Louis Vuitton out of court for €500,000, citing limited capacity at the Rotterdam District Court and the need to prioritise other cases.

Systemic implications for Luxury Retail

This case illustrates the convergence of:

• Underground banking networks
• Encrypted communications
• Cash courier systems
• Insider facilitation
• Structured retail purchases
• Cross-border resale markets
• No single handbag equalled €500 million.

Lessons for compliance officers

This case is not really about handbags. It is about how criminal money moves: Structured payments. Multiple aliases. Cross-store purchases. Insider guidance. Export and resale through Daigou channels.

At no single point does the full picture appear. It's a good reminder that:

• Criminal networks are structured, patient and threshold-aware
• Cash intensity plus repetition is a pattern, not coincidence
• Multiple identities across locations should trigger escalation
• Linked transactions matter as much as single large payments
• Insider risk is real and often operational, not dramatic
• “Know Your Customer” is behavioural, not just documentary
• Daigou is legal but holds higher risk

This didn’t look like organised crime at the counter. It looked like a customer who really liked handbags.

That’s what makes the model work: break the laundering into neat, boring pieces. Keep each payment just under the line. Spread it across stores. Add an insider who knows where the alarms are. Ship the inventory out in plain cardboard.