The fortune teller, the ghost-car syndicate & Sydney’s $70m loan-fraud ring

The setup

In our earlier stories:

• Ghost cars, luxury property & Louis Vuitton: The Barangaroo fraud saga
• Bondi beauty and dirty money: how a salon became a laundering node

We explored how a large criminal syndicate allegedly used fake luxury-vehicle finance, high-end apartments and a Bondi beauty salon to wash millions through Australia’s financial system.

Those cases sat under Strike Force Myddleton, an investigation into a network that is estimated to have laundered about A$70 million.

This story is alleged to be the latest strand in the same operation.

In Sydney’s eastern suburbs, 53-year-old “fortune teller and feng shui master” Anya Phan promised her clients prosperity, protection… and a billionaire. Police allege she used spiritual authority within the Vietnamese community to convince vulnerable people to take out loans, saying they needed to “prepare” financially for the wealth written in their stars.

The modus operandi

According to police, Phan’s approach was simple but powerful:

• Spiritual leverage
  Clients seeking guidance were told a wealthy benefactor or life upgrade was destined for them – but only if they took specific financial steps.
• Loan extraction
  Victims were encouraged to obtain substantial loans. Each time a loan was approved, Phan allegedly pocketed up to $150,000.
• Laundering path
  Proceeds were allegedly channelled through:
  • casinos, via chips and cash
  • property purchases, including high-value homes
  • assets held via family members, including her daughter, Thi Ta

One Dover Heights home reportedly carried $56,000 in monthly repayments, despite Phan having received disability benefits for two decades.

Her daughter, Ta, allegedly helped move funds into high-end assets, including a $5.3m Rose Bay apartment.

The takedown

In November 2025, detectives raided Phan’s multimillion-dollar home. Among the items seized:

• a 40-gram gold bar
• $6,600 in casino chips
• luxury handbags
• extensive financial records

Police have frozen around $15m in assets in this strand of the case, on top of roughly $60–70m already restrained in related ghost-car operations.

Phan now faces 39 charges, including:

• directing a criminal group
• obtaining a financial advantage by deception
• dealing with proceeds of crime

She was refused bail.

Her daughter faces related charges and is on conditional release.

According to Gordon Arbinja, Commander of the Financial Crimes Squad at NSW Police Force:

“What began as an investigation into fraudulent car financing has expanded into uncovering one of the most sophisticated financial crime syndicates I have seen in my career.”

He has also warned that more arrests are expected, including among professional facilitators such as lawyers, accountants and developers.

Likely AML gaps & evasion tactics

1. Misaligned borrower purpose vs loan pattern

Borrowers applied for legitimate bank loans under one stated purpose, while police allege the funds were diverted to Phan for her own financial gain.
Most loan workflows validate documentation, not whether a third party is influencing or benefiting from the loan, making this a blind spot.

Evasion tactic:
Use real borrowers with real identities, creating clean loan profiles that pass automated underwriting and KYC.

2. Third-party direction not captured in loan processes

Loan officers and monitoring systems typically assess the borrower in isolation.
Police allege Phan directed victims to apply and then took a portion of the proceeds — behaviour that isn’t tested in standard loan-originations checks.

Evasion tactic:
Operate behind legitimate borrowers to avoid triggering identity-based fraud controls.

3. Income–asset mismatch not escalated early enough

Phan allegedly held high-value properties with A$56,000 monthly repayments despite receiving long-term disability benefits — a major mismatch between income and obligations.

Evasion tactic:
Rely on lenders not scrutinising downstream asset purchases once initial loans to victims appear legitimate.

4. Rapid movement of loan proceeds into casinos

Police allege money was moved through casino chips and cash transactions shortly after loans were drawn down — a classic layering mechanism.

Evasion tactic:
Convert borrowed funds to chips or cash to break the transaction chain, relying on limited visibility between banks and casinos.

5. Property used as an integration endpoint

Funds were allegedly channelled into high-value property, including a A$5.3m Rose Bay apartment, providing a long-term store of value.

Evasion tactic:
Use property purchases to embed illicit funds in assets that appear legitimate and stable.

6. Use of family members to obscure benefit

Police allege Phan’s daughter helped acquire assets and manage funds.

Evasion tactic:
Shift ownership or asset control to relatives to reduce visible wealth or risk to the primary suspect.

7. No red flags on loan applicants themselves

Victims were ordinary individuals with real identities and clean histories — no PEP status, no sanctions exposure, no unusual risk traits.

Evasion tactic:
Exploit the fact that AML/KYC systems often focus solely on the person in front of them, not the context surrounding the borrowing.

8. Incremental extraction from multiple borrowers

Rather than large transfers from a single source, police allege Phan took smaller cuts from multiple loans over time — reducing per-transaction visibility.

Evasion tactic:
Blend illicit amounts within normal-sized consumer finance flows to avoid triggering thresholds or anomaly scoring.

9. Loans structured to appear as personal finance, not commercial activity

Personal loans generally undergo lighter scrutiny than business lending.

Evasion tactic:
Keep transactions in the “personal finance” category to avoid enhanced due diligence that businesses or companies might trigger.

AML lessons & red-flag indicators

Professionals across lending, property and advisory services should watch for:

• Income–asset mismatches: Clients on benefits or modest salaries holding multiple high-value properties or major loan obligations.
• Third-party influence: Borrowers referencing spiritual advisers, “benefactors” or community leaders as the reason for significant borrowing.
• Rapid wealth and lifestyle changes: High-end renovations, prestige purchases or business launches that don’t fit the profile.
• Unclear funding sources for property deposits, renovations or fit-outs – especially when explained vaguely as “help from friends” or “community support”.
• Cash-heavy projects: Large renovation or equipment invoices paid mostly in cash.

Viewed one by one, these can look like oddities. Viewed together, they’re a pattern.

Why this matters

For lenders, the Phan chapter shows that serious fraud doesn’t always hinge on forged documents or hacked systems. It can hinge on social influence and belief – the kind of thing that never appears in a credit report.

For AML teams, the wider Strike Force Myddleton story underlines the need for:

• behaviour-based monitoring, not just document checks
• event-driven reviews when a customer’s profile changes suddenly
• cross-sector intelligence between banks, casinos and property professionals

For Tranche 2 professions, these linked cases are a preview of what will be expected:

• probing unusual funding sources
• questioning obvious income–asset discrepancies
• recognising when “community success” or “spiritual guidance” might be masking exploitation or laundering.