Ghost cars, luxury property & Louis Vuitton: The Barangaroo fraud saga

The setup

In January 2024, detectives attached to State Crime Command’s Financial Crimes Squad and the NSW Crime Commission launched an investigation into a criminal syndicate targeting Sydney automotive financing companies under Strike Force Myddleton.

The investigation initially uncovered the syndicate was allegedly using stolen personal information to apply for loans through various financial companies to purchase luxury ‘ghost cars’ that did not exist.

Six people have previously been charged with these offences and remain before the courts. Ongoing investigations, resulting in the recent arrests of the alleged ring-leaders, revealed the syndicate’s operations extended well beyond car financing fraud to large-scale personal, business and home loan fraud against multiple financial institutions.

The modus operandi

The syndicate allegedly:

• Used stolen or synthetic identities to apply for vehicle and business finance.
• Secured loan approvals for high‑value “ghost” luxury cars that were never purchased or registered.
• Layered funds through personal and business loan proceeds, disguising the origin of the money.
• All while maintaining a luxury lifestyle at Barangaroo penthouses with Ferraris, Bentleys Louis Vuitton and other luxury goods, while the loans went unpaid.

Police traced 91 bank accounts through which approximately $178 million circulated, with $38 million in assets eventually restrained.

Likely AML gaps & evasion tactics

While the arrests came after a lengthy investigation, this case exposes classic financial crime vulnerabilities that the Australian Government is looking to fix with the new AML/CTF legislation coming into effect on 1 July 2026.

Synthetic and stolen identities bypassing KYC

By combining real personal data (like a genuine date of birth or driver’s licence) with fabricated elements, the syndicate likely passed electronic verification checks at banks and finance companies. Without enhanced due diligence or biometric verification, these applications could appear low‑risk.

No beneficial ownership visibility

Shell entities or straw directors may have been used for business loan applications, masking the true controllers known as ultimate beneficial owners (UBOS). Current AML legislation provides leeway for finance firms to overlook opaque structures and accept self-attested UBOs, making these setups hard to detect.

Fragmented financial activity across institutions

91 bank accounts across multiple providers allowed structuring and layering, keeping individual transaction flows below internal reporting thresholds. Financial institutions may have seen small slices of activity but lacked cross‑institutional visibility until AUSTRAC and police joined the dots.

Rapid loan cycling and luxury purchases

Fraudulently obtained funds were likely moved quickly into assets and lifestyle spending (designer goods, short‑term penthouse leases). This behaviour mimics classic proceeds‑of‑crime integration and is difficult to trace without real‑time suspicious matter reporting (SMRs).

Exploiting sectors outside current AML scope

Australian real estate agents, accountants, lawyers and luxury goods firms currently operate with no AML oversight. Pre‑July 2026, there is no mandatory KYC for high‑value asset purchases in these sectors - a blind spot the syndicate exploited.

The takedown

On 30 July 2025, 10 coordinated raids were executed across Sydney. They arrested two men:

• 38‑year‑old Barangaroo man, Bing “Michael” Li: 87 charges, $12.9m fraud alleged.
• 34‑year‑old Seaforth man, Yizhe “Tony” He: 107 charges, $4m fraud alleged.

Seized assets included $4.1 million worth of luxury items:

• Two Bentleys and a Ferrari 360
• $20,000 in AUD, $12,100 in USD, $1,070 in Euros
• One firearm, two tasers and body armour
• A small quantity of prohibited drugs.

NSW Crime Commission also froze assets to the value of $20 million. Together, with the previously restrained $18 million in assets from the six currently facing charges,  the total value of assets seized throughout the investigation came to $38 million.

Both were refused bail, and four others are facing related charges.

Likely AML red flags

For soon-to-be-legislated firms here are the typical red flags that could have indicated suspicious activity:

Identity and onboarding

• Multiple loan applications using similar or recycled ID documents.
• Mismatched ID elements (address vs licence vs credit history).
• Frequent use of newly incorporated companies with minimal trading history.

Transaction behaviour

• Rapid loan drawdowns followed by near‑immediate transfers or cash withdrawals.
• Funds cycling between multiple personal and business accounts.
• Payments to high‑value asset vendors without corresponding physical delivery.

Lifestyle and asset indicators

• Luxury vehicle purchases that are never registered or insured.
• Short‑term, high‑end property rentals inconsistent with declared income.
• Sudden acquisition of watches, jewellery or cars by low‑income individuals.

Accounting and banking anomalies

• Numerous accounts across different institutions for the same beneficial owner.
• Structuring activity designed to keep balances or transfers below reporting thresholds.
• Frequent third‑party payments lacking clear business purpose.

This case highlights why lawyers, accountants and real estate professionals will be critical to Australia’s expanded AML regime.  When Tranche 2 comes into effect, these typologies should trigger early detection before millions leave the financial system.